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1.  Introduction
Simplicity as a methodological orientation applies to linguistic theory just as to any 
other field of research: ‘Occam’s razor’ is the label for the basic heuristic maxim 
according to which an adequate analysis must ultimately be reduced to indispensible 
specifications. In this sense, conceptual economy has been a strict and stimulating  
guideline in the development of Generative Grammar from the very beginning. 
Halle’s (1959) argument discarding the level of taxonomic phonemics in order to 
unify two otherwise separate phonological processes is an early characteristic 
example; a more general notion is that of an evaluation metric introduced in 
Chomsky (1957, 1975), which relates the relative simplicity of alternative linguistic 
descriptions systematically to the quest for explanatory adequacy of the theory 
underlying the descriptions to be evaluated. Further proposals along these lines 
include the theory of markedness developed in Chomsky and Halle (1968), Kean 
(1975, 1981), and others, the notion of underspecification proposed e.g. in 
Archangeli (1984), Farkas (1990),  the concept of default values and related notions. 
An important step promoting this general orientation was the idea of Principles and 
Parameters developed in Chomsky (1981, 1986), which reduced the notion of 
language particular rule systems to universal principles, subject merely to 
parametrization with restricted options, largely related to properties of particular 
lexical items. On this account, the notion of a simplicity metric is to be dispensed 
with, as competing analyses of relevant data are now supposed to be essentially 
excluded by the restrictive system of principles. 
Extending this development by a further important step, the Minimalist Program 
initiated in Chomsky (1992, 1994) set out to dispense with stipulated aspects of the 
Principles and Parameters view, deriving the properties of the language capacity as 
far as possible from conditions that appear to be conceptually necessary or can be 
reduced to general requirements of cognitive capacities. This restricts, on the one 
hand, assumptions about the organization of language to what appears to be the 
conceptual minimum, and constrains, on the other hand, representational means and 
computational operations according to conditions of economy.
The general view corresponding to this development raises a number of interesting 
and by no means trivial problems. First, to the extent to which general principles of 
conceptual parsimony as well as representational and computational economy are 
supposed to determine the structure of possible languages (or rather systems of 
linguistic knowledge), the methodological maxim of simplicity appears to be turned 
into a basic characteristic of the actual subject matter. In other words, the maxim 
„Minimize x“, taken as a short-hand characterization of the Minimalist Program, 2
becomes the organizing principle of the language faculty. Second, to the extent to 
which principles of the language faculty reduce to more general conditions of 
cognitive capacities, properties of linguistic knowledge need not be stipulated, but 
are explained by independently given principles. However, by the same token the 
autonomy of the language faculty, strongly advocated so far in the tradition of 
Generative Grammar, cannot be preserved in its  strict sense, even though some 
sort of indirect autonomy, relying on the specific boundary conditions, might be a 
reasonable account of the relevant observations. I will briefly touch this point in 
section 2. 
Without taking a particular position with respect to these questions, I will explore here 
some issues the minimalist orientation raises for the organization of lexical 
information. Although I will not commit myself to specific technical assumptions 
associated with particular versions of the Minimalist Program, a number of issues 
clearly fall in place  under a fairly broad view of conceptual parsimony and 
representational economy. Two interrelated perspectives seem to be indicated in this 
respect: a) consequences of the minimalist orientation for the content and 
organization of lexical information, and  b) conditions which the role of lexical 
information imposes on other aspects of the Minimalist  Program. Obviously, these 
perspectives lead to a number of more specific problems, which will be taken up in 
turn. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the general framework 
within which the role of lexical information is to be determined; section 3 discusses 
the types of information lexical entries must accommodate and the general 
organization of entries thence emerging; section 4 is concerned with conditions 
economizing lexical entries with respect to syntactic and semantic information; 
section 5 discusses some consequences for the combinatorial aspect of the 
language capacity; and section 6 indicates provisional consequences.
2.   Lexical Information and the Organization of Language
I will be concerned with language in the sense of I-Language characterized in 
Chomsky (1986 and related work), referring to the Grammar GL as the knowledge 
determining a particular I-Language L, with Universal Grammar UG being the basic 
structure from which different I-Lanaguages emerge according to appropriate 
experience. I will assume, in particular, that G includes the Lexical System LS, i.e. 
the linguistically determined aspects of lexical knowledge. These matters will be 
made more precise as we proceed.
I-Language relates the structure of expressions to conceptual interpretations --
intuitively speaking, it defines a correspondence between sound and meaning. Using 
the terminology proposed in Chomsky (1991 and later work), these domains are 
organized by the Articulatory-Perceptual System A-P, and the Conceptual-Intentional 
System C-I, respectively. A-P and C-I are to be considered as mental systems that 
are accessed or recruited by the language capacity, although they are subject to their
own, extralinguistic principles and constraints.
1) More specifically, A-P determines the 
motoric and perceptual patterns in terms of which signals are processed, a 
conceptually necessary dimension of which is given by their temporal organization.
2)
C-I on the other hand integrates various subsystems in terms of which experience is 
conceptually organized and intentional relations to the (external and internal) 
environment are established. Without going into the complex and at best partially 3
understood problems of this domain, some sort of functor-argument (or operator-
operand) structure seems to be indispensible as a representational format, requiring 
hierarchical organization, but no intrinsic linear ordering. The correspondence I-
Language establishes between these two domains has a number of prerequisites.
First, I-language must provide a matching between patterns or configurations in A-P 
and C-I, it must hence provide interfaces with these domains. Following Chomsky 
(1993), I will call these interfaces Phonetic Form PF and Logical Form LF, 
respectively.The structure of PF and LF must be compatible (but not identical) with 
that of the domains they interface with. This has, of course, at least restricting 
consequences for the nature of PF and LF, given the different conditions inherent in 
A-P and C-I.
Second, as the form of expressions and their meaning cannot in general be mapped 
onto each other by way of analogy, the correspondence between PF and LF defined 
by the Grammar G requires PF and LF to be organized in terms of configurations of 
discrete primes or basic dimensions. In other words, both PF and LF must have 
properties of an abstract algebraic system. This leads to the following general 
schema, which indicates basic conceptual requirements:
3)
(1)                       Expression                           Content
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A-P <===>     PF  ←→ LF     <===>     C-I
1442443
I-Language
This schematization should not be taken to stipulate four separate levels or systems 
of representation. PF and LF are rather to be construed as interfaces between two 
systems, viz. A-P and G, and C-I and G, respectively. In other words, PF and LF 
recruit configurations of A-P and C-I according to the conditions of G, somewhat like 
pixels drawing on continuous shades or values.
4)
Third, as the correspondence between A-P and C-I is not based on structural 
analogy, but is arbitrary in the Saussurean sense, the relation between PF and LF  
furthermore requires a list of fixed connections established between configurations of 
the two domains. These connections constitute the lexical items of a given I-
Language, the Lexical System LS thus being a conceptually necessary aspect of the 
language capacity.
5)  Following Levelt (1989), I will call the PF-component of a lexical 
item its Lexeme, the LF-component its Lemma.
Fourth, as the correspondence between sound and meaning is defined over a 
potentially infinite range, G must provide a compositional mapping, based on a 
recursive, combinatorial structure for PF, LF, and their correspondence. It is only by 
means of this combinatorial capacity provided by UG - drawing perhaps on general 
cognitive principles - that the actual range of I-Language is established.
6) The 
important point to note here is the fact that the combinatorial structure of G has 
crucial consequences for - or rather preconditions in - the organization of lexical 
entries, which must intrinsically be disposed for combinatorial operations, a matter to 
which we will return in more detail.  4
To sum up, the following assumptions seem to be necessary: 
(2) (a)   I-Language must provide two interface levels PF and LF based on discrete 
primitive elements, the interpretation and arrangement of which are in part 
determined by the properties of A-P and C-I, respectively, the systems they 
interface with;
(b)   I-Language must contain a system LS of lexical items connecting lexemes
and lemmas pertaining to PF and LF, respectively;
(c)   I-Language must be based on recursive combinatorial operations that define
the organization and correspondence of PF and LF over a potentially infinite
range.
The content of these requirements must be spelled out in several respects, in part 
according to purely conceptual conditions, in part with respect to empirical 
constraints. As to PF, the following assumptions will be made: The basic elements 
are features, assigned to tiers and linked to segments, in terms of which the linear 
ordering mentioned earlier is organized. In accordance with their feature structure, 
segments constitute syllables, which are grouped into larger prosodic units.
7) As to 
LF, the nature of basic elements is controversial and will be taken up in section 3. 
They must be taken, in any case, as elements that are to be interpreted in C-I, hence 
representing conceptual units, combining with each other in terms of functor-
argument relations. This suggests that elements of LF are assigned to types or 
categories in the sense of Ajdukiewicz (1935), defining automatically the type of 
complex configurations.
8) I will furthermore assume that LF - just as  C-I - is not 
based on linear ordering, which means that all structural relations must be 
hierarchical in nature. It follows that functors of LF must all be of the nature indicated 
in (3):
(3)   If  α and  β are categories, then (α/β) is a complex category.
α and β might be complex or basic - where basic types may be e.g. 1 for individual 
concepts and 0 for propositions - such that a two-place relation like the concept 
HAVE is of type (0/1)/1. On these assumptions, the following claim about LF comes 
as a logical consequence:
(4)  Representations of LF are strictly binary branching structures imposed on 
primitive elements.
It follows that familiar notions like dominance, c-command immediately apply to LF 
as characterized by (4). I will have to say more about the nature of LF as we 
proceed. 
Entries of the lexical system must participate in the representational systems PF and 
LF and could hence be characterized by ordered pairs of the following general 
format:
(5)           <   PFLE,    LFLE >
where PFLE and LFLE determines the contribution of the element LE
to PF and LF, respectively.5
Both PFLE  and LFLE will have to be redundancy free or underspecified in accordance 
with pertinent principles of economy to be taken up below. I will furthermore revise 
(5) by splitting up the information to be subsumed under LFLE for reasons to be 
discussed immediately.
According to the Minimalist Program the architecture summarized in (2) is not only 
necessary, but also sufficient in the sense that there is no further level of 
representation between PF and LF; in other words, the combinatorial operations 
mentioned in (2c) are not supposed to require independent levels of representation 
with systematic properties except the interface levels LF and PF. This is a strong and 
by no means obvious assumption related to both empirical and conceptual 
considerations, which raises non-trivial questions concerning the status of syntactic 
representations. The point to be noted is, that Logical Form, although explicitly 
related to the conceptual interpretation, has always been understood in Generative 
Grammar as a level of syntactic representation. This holds explicitely for e.g. 
Chomsky (1981), but has not changed within the Minimalist Program, where LF is in 
fact considered as the only level of syntactic representation, which at the same time, 
however, specifies all that I-Language determines with respect to semantic 
interpretation. 
The problem with this double nature of LF emerges, if we consider the following two 
economy principles which play a crucial role within the Minimalist Program:
(6) Representational economy: Representations in PF and LF must not retain 
specifications that are not interpretable in the respective performance systems
A-P and C-I. (Principle of Full Interpretation FI)
(7) Derivational economy: The mapping between LF and PF is based on the least
computational expense.
Economy as specified in (6) and (7) goes beyond parsimonious conceptual necessity 
as summarized in (1); it may in fact lead to alternative realizations (concerning e.g. 
the number or complexitiy of computational steps), and there is, in any case, a 
tension between the two principles: elements that merely regulate the computational 
mapping between PF and LF, but are uninterpretable in A-P and C-I, are by virtue of 
FI either completely excluded or else must be eliminated from LF and PF by 
additional operations in conflict with (7).
9) The actual assumption is, of course, that I-
Language relies crucially on strictly grammatical, uninterpretable features that are to 
be deleted at the interface levels. Hence economy can only be realized as the 
balance between (6) and (7) (and possibly other principles). I will return to the issue 
in section 3. 
3.  The Content and Organization of Lexical Entries
Returning to the general schema (5), I will assume that there is no principled 
controversy about the nature of PFLE, a complex configuration of the level PF with all 
information omitted that follows from general rules or principles of G, in other words,  
an underspecified representation in the sense explored in Archangeli (1984), 
Steriade (1987) and related work, indicating LE’s contribution to PF.
10) Technical 
details aside, the notion of underspecification belongs to the traditional orientation 6
towards economy mentioned above, obviously to be incorporated into more recent 
conceptions of Minimalism. Things are less clear with respect to LFLE, where there 
seem to be at least two attitudes, one of which takes LFLE to be in general a primitive 
element of I-Language with respect to its interpretation in C-I, while the other 
considers it as essentially compositional, built up from more primitive elements that 
represent conditions of C-I. For the sake of discussion, I will call the former attitude 
the global view, and the latter the compositional view of LFLE. Even though the 
contrast between these two views appears to be clear enough, it is often not  obvious 
how it applies to actual proposals. 
Consider in this respect the Lexical Relational Structure LRS discussed by Hale and 
Keyser (1993), who on the one hand seem to endorse the global view, assigning no 
internal structure to basic lexical items, but who allow these items on the other hand 
to combine by incorporation into complex items. The issue can be illustrated by 
location verbs like shelve,  box, house, etc. which Hale and Keyser suppose to be 
parallel to put in the sense indicated in (8)(a) and (b) based on something like (9)(a) 
and (b) as the respective verb phrases resulting from Head Movement:
(8) (a)  She put her books on the shelf.
(b)  She shelved her books
(9) (a)  [                             [  put  ]k [ her books  [   tk [    on  [   the   shelf  ]  ]  ]  ]
(b) [  [  [  [ shelf ]i  ON ]j PUT ]k [ her books  [   tk [     tj [               ti    ]  ]  ]  ]
ON and PUT are meant to indicate the LFLE of on and put, respectively, assuming 
that these enter the construction of (8b) without contributing a PFLE for the 
application of Spell Out. Hale and Keyser argue that along these lines the 
assumption of abstract - i.e. phonetically empty - verbs like put (for location verbs) or 
provide (for locatum verbs like saddle, paint, etc), make (for result verbs like clear, 
open, etc.), together with independently motivated and constrained operations like 
Head Movement, accounts for crucial properties of possible lexical items and their 
behavior. There are various problems with this analysis, which I need not discuss 
here.
11) The main point to be noted is the fact that alongside with the operations of 
prelexical syntax there must be lexical entries like (10):
(10)         <  /shelve/ ,      [V [P [N  SHELF ] [P ON ] ]  [V PUT ] ]   >
PFLE                                                     LFLE
SHELF indicates the LFLE of the incorporated noun shelf. Entries like (10) are 
necessary, as  it is an idiosyncratic, lexical fact whether or not the incorporating verb 
for a given noun or adjective exists, and which abstract verb it supplies: chair has the 
put- and the provide-variant, saddle has only the provide-variant, ship only the put-
variant, and basket has neither. To conclude, the LRS-approach of Hale and Keyser 
eventually leads to assume a compositional LFLE for the lexical items under 
discussion, in order to account for the grammatical properties of these elements. I 
will return to this point shortly.
Looking at Jackendoff’s (1990, 1994) Lexical Conceptual Structure LCS, which is 
programmatically compositional, we notice a different problem. Jackendoff assumes 
on the one hand that his level of Conceptual Structure CS is not part of linguistic 7
knowledge, but rather provides the central representational system of language 
independent conceptual organization, i.e. of C-I in the terminology adopted here. On 
the other hand, he considers LCSs as part of lexical items, which clearly belong to 
linguistic knowledge, but also as pertaining to CS, which is clearly not part of 
linguistic knowledge. Jackendoff furthermore assumes that lexical items, which he 
considers as rules defining (in part) the correspondence between Conceptual and 
Phonological Structure of linguistic expressions, comprise syntactic besides 
phonological and conceptual  information.
12)  Yet another view, which draws or skips 
the boundary between linguistic and conceptual knowledge in different ways, is 
embodied in Pustejovsky’s (1995) conception of lexical information. Like Jackendoff, 
Pustejovsky clearly endorses a compositional view, but to what extent he considers 
the compositionality as part of I-Language or rather as a matter of general 
conceptual structure, is unclear in crucial respects.
It seems to me useful in view of these and other problems, to which I will turn 
immediately, to split up LFLE into two components, replacing the schema (5) by (11), 
where the Semantic Form SF constitutes the interface with C-I in the narrower 
sense, while the Grammatical Form GF comprises the syntactic and morphological 
information not to be interpreted outside I-Language.
(11)           <    PFLE,   <   GFLE,     SFLE >  >
So far, this revision of (5) does not necessarily deviate from the Minimalist 
assumption that there is no level besides PF and LF, as the separation of GF and SF 
need not be construed as introducing an additional representational system, but 
merely as a systematic distinction within one level of representation. This can be 
illustrated by means of a revised version of (10):
(12)                                                      V                                       
|
P                                                          GFLE
| 
N                 P              V          
/shelve/        SHELF          ON            PUT                            SFLE
PFLE LFLE
The distinction between GF and SF comes close to the problem traditionally 
conceived as the relation between syntax and semantics, if one considers semantics 
as concerned with the conceptual interpretation of language, just as phonology is 
concerned with its articulatory and auditory interpretation.
13) Formally, the distinction 
appears to correspond to that between non-terminal and terminal nodes of LF as 
indicated in (11), a plausible view to start with, but one that has to be revised on 
closer inspection. What is at issue, besides the status of the ‘sublexical components’, 
is the nature of syntactic categories or rather the grammatical features defining them. 
The issue comes in two ways.
Consider first syntactic categories like V, N, P or D and C, and their projections, 
which are specified by syntactic features like [+N, +V, ... ]. According to the principle 
of Full Interpretation FI, interface representations must not contain material 8
uninterpretable in the respective interpretive systems. This leaves apparently only 
one of two options: either category features like N, V etc. belong to the interface and 
must be interpreted in C-I by appropriate specifications, or they cannot be interpreted 
and must hence be excluded from the interface.I don’t consider the conceptual 
interpretation of features like V, N etc.  as a serious option, even if one were to resort 
to abstract ontological categories like entity, state, property or something similar. 
Ontological interpretation of syntactic categories has repeatedly been shown to be 
misguided. Hence the features in question must either be deleted before FI applies, 
or not belong to the interface level  in the first place. In separating SF as an interface 
in the narrower sense from GF as the language internal aspect of LF, we adopt the 
latter option. One might think of a third alternative, according to which syntactic 
categories reduce to reflexes of semantic (or rather conceptual) types, like 
proposition,  one-place predicate, n-place functor, etc., i.e. inherent properties of 
legitimate, interpretable interface elements of the sort defined in (3) above as a 
conceptually necessary condition of the interface, with no independent status 
assigned to them.
14)But that is obviously not the status of category features 
distinguishing e.g. V, N, C, which capture computational properties independently of  
conceptual types. Thus syntactically, items like sleep, jump,call, etc.must 
alternatively be assigned to the category N or V, even though their conceptual type 
remains the same. This observation does not exclude nontrivial correspondences 
between syntactic and conceptual categories - as we will see immediately; it clearly 
shows, however, that the former cannot be reduced to the latter, but must be 
specified in their own right.
The second issue to consider concerns morphosyntactic features specifying Case, 
Gender, Person, etc. Here the problem appears to be the inverse of the one just 
discussed: morphosyntactic features are supposed not to appear in interface 
representations because they would violate FI. Most - if not all
15) - of them do have a 
conceptual interpretation, however: Tense and Aspect relate to conditions on 
temporal structure, Number relates to cardinality, Person to participation in the 
communicative event, etc. Besides this apparent conflict - prohibition of interpretable 
features at the interface - there are at least two further problems to recognize.
First, several of the categories specified by the features in question obviate the 
conceptual interpretation under various, partially idiosyncratic conditions. Thus, 
plurale tanta suppress cardinality, inanimates obviate the sex interpretation of 
Gender, notional Case is frequently devoid of conceptual content, etc. Those 
instances of features must obviously be excluded from the interface level. 
Second, within the Minimalist Program, morphosyntactic features are supposed to 
show up pairwise and must be checked against each other in order to delete, i.e. to 
disappear from the interface representation. Thus the Tense features of the Verb 
must be matched by those of T
0, the Case feature of the Verb must be matched by 
those of a DP, etc. The checking is bound to particular configuations that are 
assumed to result from movement of one of the features (together with the whole 
constituent carrying the feature). Irrespective of the metaphor of Movement and 
Checking, it is obvious that only one of the features - either the moving or the target 
feature - is related to conceptual interpretation, while the other is not.
16)
To sum up, morphosyntactic features, which originate in lexical information of the 
items carrying them, must in principle be susceptible to conceptual interpretation at 9
the interface level, even though this cannot hold for all instances of them. Hence 
whether conceptual content is associated with a morphosyntactic feature, and if so 
which, must be specified in the lexical items in appropriate way.
From these considerations, the following conclusions emerge: 
First, both syntactic and morphological categories are characterized by features that 
must be represented in lexical items. While for morphological categories these 
features are susceptible to (and possibly based on) conceptual interpretation, this 
does not hold for all instances of them, and it does not include syntactic categories. 
Hence morphosyntactic categorization comprises lexical information that must not be 
part of the interface level, i.e. of SF in terms of the present proposal. Whether the 
component GF, which contains this information, is bound to a separate level of 
representation beyond the interface levels, will be left open for the moment.
Second, information that belongs to GF must be specified according to its status, 
categorization and subcategorization in traditional terms, Head-features and Phrasal 
features in more recent frameworks. Before I look at this problem in somewhat more 
detail, one further aspect of syntactic information has to be considered, viz. the 
nature of θ-Roles or Argument Positions and their relation to the basic components 
of SF. Let me return to this effect to the entry given in (12).
A minimal assumption implicit in the analysis of shelve and the equivalence 
illustrated in (8) requires put to provide Argument Positions for the Agent (= Subject-
DP), the Theme (= Object-DP) and the Goal (= directional PP), with Agent and 
Theme inherited by shelve. Using the parenthesis notation proposed in Grimshaw 
(1990) to indicate the hierarchy of Argument Positions, we get the following 
Argument Structures:
(13) (a)      /put/               ( Agent (Theme ( Goal )))
(b)      /shelve/      ( Agent (Theme))
There is little doubt that syntactic argument positions are closely related to and 
essentially determined by the possible conceptual interpretation of the lexical items 
they belong to. This can be made explicit in various ways. I will take up here 
proposals developed in Bierwisch (1988), Wunderlich (1991) and related work, 
where Argument Positions are represented by abstractors operating over variables in 
the SF-component of lexical items. Thus, instead of just adding (13b) to the entry 
sketched in (12), we would get something like (14), where  λ x and  λ y correspond to 
Agent and Theme of (13), respectively:
(14)   /shelve/         λy     λx         [  x   PUT  [  y   ON      SHELF  ] ]
PF                  AS             SF
The SF-component in (14) differs from that in (12) by the addition of the variables x 
and y, indicating the position for the actor of the predicate PUT and the theme of the 
relation ON. The elements PUT, ON, etc. are to be interpreted in C-I and might be 
specified with respect to their type according to the type system indicated in (3) in 
roughly the following way:10
(15)                     x          PUT         y           ON          SHELF
|             |            |              |                  |
1        (0/1)/0       1          (0/1)/1            1




This is a simplification in various respects
17), but it nevertheless allows two 
generalizations to be indicated. First, the basic elements of SF - which are either 
constants like ON, PUT, etc. or variables x, y, z, etc. - are ranked relative to each 
other in terms of the functor-argument relation. This can be made explicit by means 
of the following definition:
(16)   X a-commands Y in  Z iff
(a) X’ is the argument of the functor Y’ in Z, and 
(b) X and Y are (proper or improper) parts of X’ and Y’, respectively.
According to (16) an argument-expression X’ and all its (imporper) parts argument-
command the functor Y’ (and all its parts) that applies to it. Thus in Z = (15), x a-
commands [PUT [y ON SHELF] ], and hence x also a-commands y, just as the 
argument  [y ON SHELF] - and hence also its part y - a-commands PUT. The ranking 
thus defined will be put touse directly Second, the SF of major lexical categories can 
be assumed to belong to a highly restricted range of possible types; canonically, they 
are of type 0, i.e. they specify a propositional condition on conceptual interpretation. 
The apparent deviation, according to which e.g. shelve is is to be considered as a  
two-place relation, is due to the argument positions λx and λy, as indicated in (14).
The next point to be taken up concerns the ordering of the lambda operators in the 
Argument Structure AS. This ordering reflects the hierarchy of the Theta-Roles: the 
Theme λy is the lower role that must be applied first, the Agent λx is the higher role 
to be applied only after λy. This ranking is directly determined by the ranking of 
pertinent variables in SF via the following principle:
(16)   λy  is subordinate to (i.e. precedes)  λx in AS, if x a-commands y in SF.
Intuitively, the effect of (16) is to project the ranking of variables in SF into syntactic 
relations defined in terms of c-command. Actually, (16) is in need of certain 
refinements that need not concern us here. 
So far, the Argument Structure defines what Chomsky (1986) called s-selection, i.e. 
the subcategorization of lexical items related to their semantic or conceptual 
properties represented in SF. The way in which this aspect is represented here 
explicitly relies on the notion that the head-complement relation in syntax 
corresponds semantically to functional application. In other words, combining a 
lexical head with its syntactic complement amounts to specifying the variable bound 
by the argument position by means of the information provided by the complement, 
thereby eliminating the argument position according to the standard operation of 
lambda conversion.  11
With this background let me return to the problem of morpho-syntactic features to be 
associated with lexical entries. I will discuss these features in terms of the traditional 
distinction between categorization and subcategorization, where the latter boils down 
to what Chomsky (1986) calles c-selection. To begin with, categorization in terms of 
syntactic features like [αV], [βN], morphological features specifying Case, Number, 
Gender, etc. might simply be represented as a set of formal features in the usual 
way, extending e.g. (14) to something like (17):
(17)    /shelve/         [+V,-N,...]          λx    λy      [  y  PUT  [  x  ON   SHELF  ] ]
Several issues arise with respect to this part of GFLE,  in particular the question of 
which features may show up, and how they are to be interpreted. These will be 
discussed in connection with the features  specifying subcategorization with respect 
to c-selection in the sense of Chomsky (1986), to which I will turn next.
C-selection is incumbent on s-selection, adding predictable or idiosyncratic 
conditions regarding the morpho-syntactic realization of semantically licensed 
arguments
18). The minimal assumption to account for this relation is to associate 
features of c-selection with their respective lambda operators. In other words, an 
argument position in AS is an ordered pair < λx,  F  >, where F represents the formal 
conditions imposed on arguments to be theta-marked by λx.  In this sense, (17) 
might provisionally be completed as in (18), with [Acc] and [Nom] indicating Case-
features to be matched by the Object and Subject, respectively:
(18)     /shelve/     [+V, -N, ... ]         λx        λy     [  y  PUT  [  x    ON   SHELF  ]  ]
|            |
[Acc]    [Nom] 
C-selection features (c-features, for short) are to a large extent structurally 
predictable and must not be lexically specified, as we will see shortly. What should 
be clear, however, is their combinatorial effect. Essentially, c-features specify the 
properties a lexical head Ximposes on the morpho-syntactic categorization of its 
complements Y1, ... , Yk.
19) If these conditions are met,  X stepwise merges with Yj
into the complex  [ [X  Y1 ]... Yk ] or [Yk ... [ Y1 X ] ] for k ≥  i  ≥ 1. At each step, one 
argument position is saturated by functional application and disappears from the 
Argument Structure.
20) Thus, c-features must be matched by the category features of 
the argument for the Theta-role to be assigned. It follows that all c-features must in 
principle also occur in the categorization part of GFLE. Although this does not imply 
that the converse also holds, the simplest assumption is that categorization and 
subcategorization rely on the same possible features. Their actual choice is a matter 
of each particular G - or rather its Lexical System. 
This leaves us with the question of how formal features are interpreted.This question 
has two parts. One part concerns their role as formal features in the computational 
system of language.The matching between categorization and c-selection belongs to 
this aspect, and we will have to say more about it in section 4. Crucially, feature 
matching is completely neutral with respect to possible conceptual interpretation. Not 
only do features like  [Masculine] or [Plural] in e.g. German Tisch (table) or Ferien
(vacation), respectively, not correspond to the expected interpretation, but also -
more systematically by the fact, that features specifying agreement conditions like 12
Person or Number must not be interpreted twice, even though agreement requires 
them by definition to start out in two different positions.
The other part of the issue concerns the conceptual interpretation which may 
nevertheless be associated with formal features. This interpretation must obviously  
be separate from, but still related to their status as formal elements, and the relation 
must not be arbitrary in the sense in which e.g. PF and SF are related in a lexical 
entry. To put it the other way round: features for Gender, Number, Person etc. are 
based on elements of SF, which are taken up by the computational system according 
to conditions  that are independent from the conceptual interpretation. How this 
relation is to be represented appropriately, is anything but obvious. Instead of making 
inconclusive proposals, I will merely indicate two of the various  types of problems 
that must be captured. 
Consider first the feature [+Past], which is one of the options determining the 
relevant syntactic properties of tensed clauses, but also determines the various 
morphological realizations of past tense in English as discussed e.g. in Halle and 
Marantz (1993). Besides this function as a formal feature, past tense contributes to 
the conceptual interpretation by the condition (19)(b), where ‘e’ is a variable over 
states and events, to which I will return shortly, ‘u’ a variable for the (indexical) 
utterance event, and ‘Tx’ a function assigning a time interval to ‘x’:
(19)  (a)       [ + Past ]                    (b)      [ [ T e ]  BEFORE  [ T u ] ]  
Notice that the internal structure of (19b) is crucial for the interpretation at SF, while it 
must be ‘invisible’ to the syntactic and morphological effects of (19a) just mentioned. 
Hence the apparently simplest way to account for the non-arbitrary relation between 
(19)(a) and (b), viz. to replace [+Past]  by its SF structure (19b), does not meet the 
actual requirement. 
That this short cut is inappropriate becomes even more obvious if we consider the 
second example. In German (and various other languages) directional prepositions 
differ from their locative counterpart by the Case condition imposed on their 
complement: directional prepositions require Accusative, locative prepositions 
require Dative. Assuming a functor FIN that picks out the final part of its argument,
21)
the contrast between locative and directional in (in/into) can be represented by (20a) 
vs. (20b):
(20) (a)   / in /     [ -V, -N, -Dir ]       λx        λy            [  y  [  LOC  [ INTERIOR  x ] ] ]
|
[+Dat]
(b)   / in /      [-V, -N, +Dir ]       λx        λy     [  FIN y  [ LOC  [ INTERIOR  x ] ] ]
|
[+Acc]
The point to be noted is that even though the locative/directional alternation is a 
lexical property of the individual prepositions including an (at), auf (on), vor (before, 
in front of), hinter (behind), über (above), unter (below), but not nach (to), aus (out 
of), there is an obvious systematicity relating Case assignment and directionality.
This can be made explicit if we collapse (20)(a) and (b) by means of notational 13
conventions proposed by Chomsky and Halle (1968) for rules of phonology into a 
complex entry like (21), where [+Oblique] distinguishes Dative from Accusative:
(21)  / in /     [-V, -N, αDir ]     λx        λy    [ (α FIN ) y   [ LOC  [ INTERIOR x  ] ] ]
|                      
[−αObl]
The variable α ranges over + and −, and the notation (α X ) indicates that X is 
present if α is +, and absent otherwise. With these conventions, (21) states that the 
complement of the directional preposition must be [-Obl] - i.e. Accusative - and the 
component FIN in SF is present, while for the non-directional preposition the 
complement is [+Obl] - i.e. Dative - and FIN is absent from SF. Even though there is 
no direct interpretation of [-Obl] in terms of FIN, the relation is not a mere accident 
either: the Case feature realized by the object of the preposition is related to the 
presence or absence of FIN in SF by the value of the variable α, which furthermore 
connects it to the feature [Dir] in the categorization.
22)
Although (21) explicitly expresses the connection between subcategorization and 
semantic directionality, it still does not appropriately capture the relevant 
systematicity. As Chris Wilder (personal communication) observes, the analysis 
given in (21) does not exclude  prepositions where the converse relation holds 
between subcategorization and directionality by simply registering the specification 
[αObl] instead of [−αObl]. Hence an appropriate account should prevent arbitrary 
lexical Case by systematically connecting  FIN to Accusative. This can be done in the 
following way:
(22) (a)    / in /     [-V,-N]        λx      λy     [ (FIN)  y  [ LOC  [  INTERIOR  x  ] ] ]
(b)   For [-V,-N], the lowest position λx is associated with [-Obl], if FIN y is 
present in its SF.
(22a) is the lexical entry for in, providing its locative or directional reading, depending 
on the absence or presence of the optional functor FIN, with the categorization [+Dir] 
determined by general condition as mentioned in footnote 22. The relation of 
directionality to Case is now represented by the general condition (22b), which can 
be construed as a lexical rule that belongs to the language particular conditions on 
Case-assignment to be discussed in section 4. It rests on two assumptions: First, the 
neutral Case, structurally assigned to the object position of prepositions is Dative 
(see (57c) below), such that locative prepositions, for which FIN is dropped, are 
automatically provided with [+Obl] for λx. Second, lexically fixed, inherent Case 
features have precedence over those assigned by general conditions, including 
(22b), such that e.g. zu (to) and nach (towards) will be blocked for (22b) by lexical 
[+Obl], even though both are directional. It might be noted that the choice of Dative 
as the structural Case of prepositions in German is an empirical issue, which might 
turn out to be wrong. This does not affect, however, the general orientation 
underlying (22), to which some comments are to be added.
First, the precise formulation of (22b) might be in need of modification, identifying the 
relevant components FIN and λx in more systematic ways by means of their 
structural position in AS and SF of the entry. Although matters of formulation are no 14
marginal issue, they do not affect the main point to be made here. Second, the 
generalization about prepositions ranging from an (at) to zwischen (between) and 
exhibiting the pattern illustrated in (21) is now extracted and made explicit by (22b) 
(and condition (i) in note 22, for that matter). With this condition, arbitrary lexical 
alternatives of the sort mentioned above are excluded. Third, as (22b) explicitly 
shows, there is no intrinsic connection between Case features, which are assigned to 
λx, and the directionality component, which is a functor applying to y. In other words, 
the argument marked by the relevant Case features is not responsible for the 
conceptual aspect of directionality. Fourth, even though (22b) extracts the 
generalization just discussed, it does not explain why directionality is related to 
Accusative rather than Dative, as pointed out by Jane Grimshaw (personal 
communication) - if there is anything to be explained.
Whether the SF-interpretation of formal features is in fact the same phenomenon in 
cases like (19) and (22) is by no means obvious (see also note 22). What they do 
have in common, though, is the fact that the relation between a formal feature and a 
semantic condition is not merely incidental or idiosyncratic.
Let me summarize the organization of lexical information as discussed so far: 
Besides PFLE and SFLE, the interfaces with extralinguistic systems, there are three 
types of information contained in the component GFLE without direct external 
interpretation. First categorization in terms of formal features, second s-selection in 
terms of Argument Positions based on variables in SFLE, and third c-selection in 
terms of formal features associated with the Argument Positions.    
The Argument Structure (or subcategorization component), comprising s-selection 
and c-selection, specifies crucial aspects of  the combinatorial properties by which 
lexical items build up complex expressions. It also constitutes, in a way, the interface 
between syntax and semantics: on the one hand, Argument Positions project 
semantic variables into the range of possible syntactic arguments, on the other hand 
AS combines this semantically based information with the formal features 
determining its syntactic realization. Further aspects of this syntax-semantics 
interface, including those bearing directly on economy of lexical information, will be 
discussed below.
4.  Aspects of Parsimony in Lexical Representation                                                                           
There are a number of problems, not addressed in the examples discussed so far, 
that are relevant from a minimalist point of view. First, the discussion of shelve, 
based on the analysis of Hale and Keyser (1993),  assumed the SF of put  and on to 
be based on simple constants PUT and ON, which is certainly inadequate for 
principled reasons, if underspecification of lexical information is supposed to apply to 
SFLE. The entry for German in given in (22) illustrates the way in which further 
analysis of SFLE might proceed, pursuing principles of componential analysis 
explored e.g. in Jackendoff (1990) and related work. The basic orientation of this 
analysis is close to  that of underspecification in phonology. Instead of sketching  a 
necessarily incomplete theory of underspecification in semantics, I will merely 
illustrate the issue by some examples. Consider verbs like open, clear, flatten, etc. 
related to the corresponding adjectives and appearing in either transitive (causative) 15
or intransitive (unaccusative) constructions. In order to account for their lexical 
representation, I will introduce the following SF-components:
(23) (a)   x  DO  P     where x represents an individual involved in the activity P
(b)  e  CAUSE e’  where e represents an event that causes the event e’
(c)  e  INST p    where e  instantiates the proposition p, a proposition being a 
set of eventualities.
As I am not striving for a model theoretic semantics, I will restrict myself to the 
intuitive  interpretation of DO, CAUSE, and INST indicated in (23).
23) By means of 
these elements the following elements can be defined:
(24) (a)   x  DO-CAUSE  p   ==DEF e INST [ x DO  P ]  &  e’ INST  p  &   e CAUSE  e’
(b)  e INST [ BECOME  p ]   ==DEF [ INIT e ] INST  NOT p  :  [FIN e]  INST  p
(24b) defines the change from not-p to p by means of the functor FIN already 
mentioned and its counterpart INIT, which picks out the initial part of its argument. 
The colon ‘:’ in (24b) is to be interpreted as an asymmetrical conjunction, such that in 
p : q the precondition p must hold for the condition q to be true or false. In other 
terms, p is a presupposition of q.
24) Hence the two states involved in  BECOME p,  
viz. the source state NOT p and the target state p, are asymmetrical in the sense that 
p may be true or false only if it is preceded by NOT p. With these prerequisites, the 
lexical entries for intransitive and transitive open can be given as (26) and (27), 
respectively, assuming (25) for the adjective involved:
(25)  / open /  [+V,+N ]        λx        [ OPEN  x ]
(26)  / open /  [+V,-N ]        λx  λe  [ e INST [ BECOME [ OPEN  x ] ] ]
(27)  / open /  [+V,-N ]  λx  λy  λe  [ e INST [ y  DO-CAUSE [ BECOME [ OPEN x ] ] ] 
]
Notice that for the two verbs open, the Argument Structure provides the event-
position λe based on the argument e of the operator INST in SFLE. This accounts for 
the reference of verbal constructions to states or events assumed by Higginbotham 
(1985) and others. This extension of AS together with its background in SF is, of 
course, to be assumed for shelve in (18) and for verbs in general.  Morpho-syntactic 
aspects of this extension will be taken up directly, together with further issues, 
including the predictability of c-selection features. First, though, two general issues 
concerning SF need to be addressed.
On the one hand, the semantic interpretation of constructions containing the verb 
open must account for the two states involved in the transition from being closed to 
being open, and in particular for the presuppositional status of the source state, as 
shown by simple cases like (28), which are taken care of by the definition in (24):
(28) (a)  He opened the box, because it was closed.
(b)  #He opened the box, because it was not closed in the first place.
(c) He did not open the box, because it was not closed in the first place
(d) He did not open the box, hence it remained closed as before.16
Considerations of parsimony and underspecification, on the other hand, require SFLE
to be free of predictable information. We thus have to motivate entries like (26) and  
(27) in two directions: that they need to specify the degree of decomposition 
assumed here, and that they need and must not specify more. Let me take up the 
second point first. 
The fact that causation involves two events, instantiating the cause and the effect, 
respectively, and that the change of state indicated by BECOME requires a 
precondition and a condition (or source- and target-state, for that matter) is clearly 
relevant for the interpretation in C-I, and it has usually been taken for granted, e.g. in 
most of the literature on presupposition, that these conditions belong to the structure 
of I-Language.
25) If this assumption is correct, the interface that relates I-Language to 
C-I must explicitly contain the conditions specified in the definiens for DO-CAUSE, 
BECOME, etc. instead of the definitionally reduced representations. In other words, 
the SFLE of (26) must be expanded into (29):
(29)      [ [ INIT e ]  INST  NOT [ OPEN x ]   :   [  FIN  e ]  INST  [ OPEN x ] ]
Similarly for (27). If the reduction of (29) to (26) on the basis of (24b) is not merely a 
notational issue, but does relate to empirical matters, as I will argue below, then (26) 
is somehow the semantic counterpart to phonological underspecification.
26) In other 
words, even if structures like those in (26) and (29) do not constitute separate levels 
of representation, but merely different degrees of specification with respect to one 
level, they must still be considered as distinct aspects of the overall representational 
system of Semantic Form.
Consider now reasons why the compositional structure of SFLE for open should at 
least be as detailed as in (26)/(27). The difference between the causative and the 
inchoative (i.e. unaccusative) version of open does not only turn on the Argument 
Position of the Agent, but also on the Causative component that is present in (30)(a) 
and the passive (b), but not the inchoative (c):
(30) (a)   He opened the door     (b)  The door was opened      (c)  The door opened
In a similar vein, the presence of BECOME in both (26) and (27) as opposed to (25) 
is born out by the contrast between (31)(a) and (b), where (b) needs the copula be to 
provide the event-instantiation and Tense.
(31) (a)  The shop opened in the morning     (b)  The shop was open in the morning
The systematicity underlying these examples is borne out not only by verbs like 
open,  clear, darken, fasten, stiffen, etc. whose resulting state is described by a 
pertinent adjective, but by the large class of verbs like break, change, turn, etc. often 
called ‘ergative’. Notice, however, that in spite of this systematicity, the two verbs 
open cannot simply be dismissed in favor of prelexical syntax incorporating the 
relevant adjective. The existence of the verbs and the adjectives and their specific 
PFLE must rather be registered as a lexical fact. Thus, while the adjective clear
provides both the causative and the inchoative verb, clean provides only the 
causative option. 17
The notational conventions applied earlier to the locative and directional prepositions 
allow for a simplification in the case of causative/inchoative verbs in the same vein. 
Consider two of the various readings of get occurring in (32)(a) and (b) with the 
entries in (33) and (34), respectively, where P is a variable over prepositional 
phrases and other predicates:
(32)(a) He got them into the room         (b)   They got into the room
(33)  / get /   [+V,-N]   λP  λx   λy   λe   [ e INST [ y DO-CAUSE [ BECOME [ P x ] ] ] ]
(34)  / get /   [+V,-N]    λP  λx          λe   [ e INST [  BECOME  [ P x ] ] ] 
The way in which (33) and (34) can be collapsed is indicated in (35), where λy is 
present in AS iff the Cause-component is present in SF:
(35) /get/  [+V,-N]  λP λx  (α λy)  λe  [ e INST [ (α y DO-CAUSE) [ BECOME [ P x ] ] ] ]
There is some evidence that the notational conventions borrowed from phonology do 
in fact express empirically relevant generalizations. Assuming the predictability of 
features specifying c-selection in ways to which we will return, λx in (35) is 
associated with Accusative, iff λy is present, receiving Nominative otherwise. But this 
is exactly what has been called Burzio’s Generalization, which now follows from 
more general conditions on lexical items. To be more precise, the effect of Burcio’s 
Generalization depends on the interaction of conditions on structural Case like those 
in (57) below, and the principles of disjunctive ordering as used in (35), the latter 
providing the alternative structures to which the former apply. It should be obvious, 
that (26) and (27) collapse in the same way. We might consider, however, a further 
step including the adjective (25) into one entry in the following way:
(36)     / open /        [ +V,−βN ]   
λx  (β  ( α λy )  λe      [ e INST  [ (α y DO-CAUSE) [ BECOME) [ OPEN x ] ] ] ]    
Besides the optional DO-CAUSE component and the Agent Position bound to it, (36) 
relates the value of the categorial feature N to AS and SF in such a way, that only 
the information of (25) is left, if [+ N] is chosen in the categorization component. Two 
points are worth noticing in this respect. First, this reduction would be extremely 
complex - if possible at all - on the basis of the ‘expanded’ representation derived by 
means of (24), indicating the pre-state and the target-state separately. Second, the 
independently motivated notational conventions for disjunctive ordering of 
phonological rules naturally apply to lexical information of various sorts. This does 
not show, of course, that the analysis under consideration is correct, but it might 
suggest that it is on the right track. Notice, incidentally, that the idiosyncrasy blocking 
e.g. the inchoative reading for clean would come out as (37), where, differing from 
(36), there is no optionality of the DO-CAUSE  component in the case of [+V,-N], i.e. 
if β  is +.
27)
(37)   / clean /     [+V, -βN ]
λx   (β λy      λe     [ e  INST  [ y  DO-CAUSE  [ BECOME ) [ CLEAN  x ] ] ] ]18
So far, considerations of economy in lexical information concentrated on SFLE , 
touching only occasionally on categorization and subcategorization, to which I will 
turn now more systematically.
A rather general point to be noted here concerns the fact that Argument Structure 
depends on both syntactic and semantic conditions in rather specific ways. One 
aspect of this dependency relates to the ranking and content of Argument Positions 
discussed earlier. Due to (16), conditions of SFLE are projected into AS, thereby 
ultimately determining the syntactic behavior of lexical items. I will consider now 
conditions  relating AS to syntactic category features. To this effect, the following 
types of Argument Positions will be distinguished:
(38) (a) Referential vs. nonreferential Positions
(b) Designated vs. nondesignated Positions
(c) Obligatory vs. optional Positions        
A Referential Position can be used to specify a referential domain with respect to 
which the type of reference is determined by an appropriate functional category.
28)
The functional elements to be considered here are D for nouns and C (and possibly 
Tense) for verbs. The notion of a Designated Role modifies or generalizes the earlier 
distinction between external and internal Positions, which became inadequate under 
the VP-internal subject analysis. Roughly speaking, the Designated Argument 
Position of a lexical item is that of a possible subject. As we will see shortly, this 
holds for all major lexical categories. The distinction of optional vs. obligatory 
arguments should be obvious. It lies behind contrasts such as (39)(a) and (b), turning 
on the pseudo-intransitive use of verbs like read, drink, etc. which is not available for 
donate, demote, etc.
(39) (a)  He didn’t want to read (it)
(b) He didn’t want to donate *(it)
With these distinctions in mind, the following generalizations can be formulated. 
Let (40) be the schema of the Categorization and the Argument Positions of any 
lexical entry LE; then the conditions (41)(a) - (e) hold:
(40)          [ αV, βN, ...  ]            λxn ...  λx1 λx0 for  n   ≥ 0
(41) (a)   For any LE, there is exactly one Designated Position λxi. 
(b)  λxi is nondesignated iff λxk is the Designated Position and i  >  k.       
(c)  For [+N], any non-designated  Position λxk is optional.
(d)  λx0 is a Referential Position iff  α  =  −β   for  [ αV, βN ].
(e)  For [+V], the Designated Position is not a Referential Position.
According to (41a) any major lexical category, including N, A, and P, has a potential 
subject position. Its actual realization by a syntactic subject might involve a copula, 
however, as illustrated in (42):
(42) (a) He is happy.      (b)  She was in London.     (c)   He became a doctor.   19
(41b) requires the Designated Position to rank above all non-designated ones, which 
are, moreover, always optional for Adjectives and Nouns according to (41c). This 
means, that  [+N]-items have only weak capacity to govern complements.
29) In other 
words, for Adjectives and Nouns, optionality of complements is the default case, 
while Verbs and Prepositions require their complements to be syntactically realized, 
unless they are lexically marked as optional (as illustrated in (39)). According to 
(41d), all and only Nouns or Verbs are capable to establish referential domains by 
means of their highest Argument Position. For Nouns, this capacity is based on the 
Designated  Position because of (41b), while (41e) requires the Referential Position 
of Verbs to be different from and hence higher than the Designated Position. Thus 
the event reference of Verbs is a consequence of (41e), if the highest position of 
Verbs is automatically related to the event instantiation in SF.
30) Condition (41e) is 
stated for [+V]-elements, but it doesn’t have any effect for Adjectives, as these, 
according to (41d), don’t have a Referential Position in the first place. It might  be 
noted, incidentally, that it is only for Verbs that the Event Position must be different 
from the Designated Position, while for event nominals like fall, kick, destruction, etc. 
the event instantiation provides the Referential as well as the Designated Position, 
as can be seen in (43)(a) and (b), respectively:
(43) (a)  John’s arrival came as a surprise.
(b)  The first scene is the arrival.
As a matter of fact, most of the differences between arrive  and arrival follow from 
the conditions in (41), if the affix -al simply changes the categorization from Verb to 
Noun.
31) 
Notice that (41e) implies a subject position for verbs, even if there is no semantic 
variable to be bound by it, as e.g.  in the so-called weather verbs. Hence in order to 
satisfy (41e), a verb like rain, the SFLE of which is roughly a propositional constant 
RAIN instantiated by an event, must provide an improper argument λx, which is an 
empty operator to be saturated by a semantically empty subject. On the basis of 
these considerations the entry for rain could be (44), which accounts for both the 
Noun and the Verb:
(44)    / rain /       [ αV , −αN ]       (α λx )  λe    [ e INST [  RAIN ] ]
For +V, the subject position is present, for +N it is missing. Under this interpretation, 
(41) characterizes wellformed Argument Structures. But one might interpret (41) just 
as well as principles simplifiying lexical information, such that (44) reduces to (45), 
the Argument Positions following from (41):
(45)       / rain /        [ αV,  −αN ]          [ e INST  [ RAIN ] ]      
The conditions given in (41) can be expressed in various ways; they may, in 
particular, be stated in terms of features that differ from V and N in certain respects, 
a problem that I will not take up here
32). The notions made explicit in (41) could 
intuitively be paraphrased as follows:
(46) (a)  V and N are primary categories, due to their referential capacity.
(b)  Verbal reference is separate from grammatical subject position.
(c)  N and A are ‘weak’ governors.20
I will leave it open to what extent these conditions are parameterized, i.e. susceptible 
to language particular variation.
33) What I want to emphasize, though, is the fact that 
(41) indicates the type of interpretation associated with the formal features for 
syntactic categorization: syntactic features, differing in this respect from 
morphological features discussed above, are related to computational properties 
exclusively, based on categorization, subcategorization, and their combinatorial 
consequences.
These properties include also the morphological features associated with the 
Argument Positions according to conditions to which I will turn next. It should be 
obvious that these conditions must be sensitive to language particular variation, 
depending on the morphological categories realized in a given language. Instead of 
going into the necessarily varied details, I will merely indicate the lines along which c-
selection features can be associated with positions indicating s-selection.
The first point to be noted is the well known distinction between structural, i.e. 
predictable, and lexical, i.e. idiosyncratic, features. Although this distinction has 
largely been applied to Case, it is equally relevant for categories like Status in the 
sense of Bech (1955). Let me begin by briefly illustrating the character of 
idiosyncratic c-selection, as this clearly shows where the pertinent features must be 
assigned. In the following German examples, (a) is the canonical type with respect to 
which (b) exhibits inherent lexical information, marked by italics:
(47) (a)  Wir schliefen      (We slept)      (b)  Wir froren / Uns  fror          (We felt cold)
(48) (a) Er traf sie            (He met her)   (b)   Er begegnete ihr (/*sie)     (He met her)
(49) (a) Er sagte ihr etwas                                                  (He told her something)
(b) Er fragte sie (/*ihr) etwas                                       (He asked her something)
(50) (a) Er glaubte, daß er stieg/ Er glaubte zu steigen      (He thought he was rising)
(b) Er begann zu steigen (/*daß er stieg)                    (He began to rise)
(51) (a) Er behauptet, daß er krank ist/ krank zu sein         (He claims to be ill)
(b) Er sagt, daß er krank ist (/*krank zu sein)              (He says that he is ill)
(47) to (49) have to do with lexical Case, (50) and (51) illustrate conditions on finite 
and infinite complement clauses. More specifically, frieren in (47b) belongs to a small 
group of verbs whose designated argument can be realized by the regular 
Nominative wir or the idiosyncratic Accusative uns. In (48), begegnen illustrates the 
somewhat larger group of verbs whose only object must idiosyncratically be realized 
by a Dative like ihr instead of the canonical Accusative sie. The idiosyncrasy of 
fragen in (49b) on the other hand lies in the fact that the indirect object must be 
realized as the Accusative sie  instead of the regular Dative ihr. The way in which 
these conditions may enter the lexical information has provisionally been indicated in 
(18) and (20) - (22). Thus the lexical Case of verbs like frieren or fragen  yields 
entries like (52) and (53):
(52)  / frier /       [+V, -N]            λx     λe      [ e  INST  [  COLD  x ] ] 
|21
([+Obj])
(53)  / frag /       [+V, -N]       (λx)   (λy)   λz    λe       [ e INST [ z  [ [ ASK  x ]  y ] ] ]
|
[−Obl]
The feature [+Obj] distinguishes Accusative and Dative from Nominative, [+Obl] 
distinguishes Dative from Accusative, as noted earlier. More generally, we might 
tentatively characterize the morphological Cases of German as follows:
(54)                           Nominative    Accusative       Dative       Genitive
Objective                −                     +                     +                   −    
Oblique                  −                     −                     +                   +  
With these notational conventions, (52) indicates that the subject of frieren may 
optionally  be realized as Accusative
34), while (53) requires the indirect object to be 
non-oblique, i.e. Accusative, instead of the Dative normally assigned to the indirect 
object.
35) Notice, incidentally, that the parentheses in (53) indicate the optionality of 
the direct as well as the indirect object, attested by sentences like (55), all of which 
are grammatical:
(55) (a)   Er hat dich etwas gefragt                   (b)   Er hat dich gefragt                           
(c)   Er hat etwas gefragt                          (d)   Er hat gefragt                                
In a similar vein conditions determining finite and infinite complement clauses, 
including Exceptional Case Marking, and a number of related phenomena must be 
accounted for. I will not go into the complex issues that a reasonable account would 
have to deal with. 
Although idiosyncratic c-selection as illustrated so far must simply be lexically 
registered, its specification depends on structural conditions in two respects. First, 
underspecified, redundancy-free characterization of lexical Case requires general 
conditions that account for the canonical information to be filled in. Thus the 
canonical Accusative of the direct object in (53), as well as the feature [+Obj] to 
complete the idiosyncratic Accusative, must follow from general conditions. Second, 
even the idiosyncrasy of lexical Case is subject to limiting constraints. For example, 
while German has a small set of verbs governing two Accusatives, there are no 
verbs requiring two Datives. In a way, the conditions to be considered in this respect 
set the stage for both structural and idiosyncratic c-selection.
The first of these conditions seems to be independent of any language specific 
morphology:
(56)  The highest Argument Position λx0 in (40) is never associated with c-selection 
features.
Together with the conditions of (41), principle (56) has a number of interesting 
consequences. First, it prevents the Designated Argument of all categories except V 
from carrying any morphological information. This accounts for the fact that N, A, and 
P as (heads of) predicatives do not specify the necessary Case information to 22
identify the subject, but rather depend on the copula (and its INFL) to this effect. 
Second, it allows A and P to act as (heads of) modifiers, which can unify their 
Designated Argument Position with an Argument of the modified head, a possibility 
to which I will return shortly. Third, it provides the basis for referential interpretation of 
N and V by means of their respective functional heads D and C.
36)
In a way, (56) tells morphological information where not to go. As it does not refer to 
any specific features, it should be construed as a principle of UG, not restricted by 
language particular properties. The following conditions, on the other hand, indicate 
how morphological information is actually distributed. As should be expected, this 
distribution depends, among other things, on syntactic categorization, and it must be 
susceptible to language particular conditions to the extent to which morphological 
Case features are subject to language particular variation. (57) determines Structural 
Case for German (the parentheses in (57a) indicating the options of intransitive, 
transitive, and ditransitive verbs):    
(57) (a)  Structural Case for entries of category [+V, - N] :
{    λx3    {    λx2   } }       λx1 λx0
|                  |                  |          
[+Obj]          [+Obj]         [−Obj]
[−Obl]      [+Obl]         [−Obl]
(b)  Structural Case for entries of category [+N, -V] :
λx2 λx1 λx0
|                    | 
[−Obj]            [−Obj]         
[+Obl]            [+Obl]   





According to (57a), Dative can occur only if Accusative can be assigned, and 
Accusative presupposes that Nominative is assigned (the latter usually called 
Burzio’s Generalization, as already mentioned). For nouns, complements are 
optional anyway, hence no interdependency is indicated - although this is not the 
whole story. (57c) applies to adjectives and prepositions, expressing the somewhat 
provisional generalization that Structural Case of the sole possible object is Dative in 
both cases. This assumption is based on the observation that adjectives allowing 
objects, like bequem (convenient), ähnlich (similar), or bekannt (known), and 
prepositions not participating in the locative/directional alternation shown in (22), i.e. 
prepositions like mit (with), bei (near), von (from/of), or nahe (near) take Dative 
complements, irrespective of the thematic role assigned. It might be noted that by 
virtue of (56) λx0 is never associated with Case features and could hence be 
dropped from (57), such that only positions actually taking Structural Case are 
referred to. Notice furthermore that assignment of Nominative in accordance with 23
(57a) might be dependent on Tense or Finiteness, a point that will be left aside here. 
The general consequence to be emphasized, however, is the simplification of lexical 
entries, from which all features predicted by (57) are to be eliminated.
Let me conclude this discussion of c-selection with the following remarks. First, as 
already noted, Structural Case assignment is language particular - thus (57) turns on 
German Case features as sketched in (54), and it is category specific, verbs differing 
also in this respect from nouns, adjectives, and prepositions. It remains to be seen 
whether and how Structural Case conditions can be reduced to universal principles 
from which (57) would emerge by appropriate choice of parameter values.
37) Second, 
(57) states only conditions on nominal complements, which realize Case. It has to be 
extended in non-trivial ways to conditions on Argument Positions assigned to CPs, 
PPs  or APs, instead of DPs. These extensions must furthermore take care of 
Argument Positions for which no structural features are available, such as 
prepositional objects. Even though these extensions will involve issues left aside 
here - e.g. the conditions to which the choice between finite and infinite complement 
clauses is related - (57) illustrates central mechanisms of c-selection and the 
economy of lexical information which they provide for. Finally, as already mentioned, 
structural conditions like (57) provide the background against which lexical features 
of c-selection operate, overriding, so to speak, the default conditions of Structural 
Case.
38)
I need not emphasize that the organization of lexical information as discussed so far 
is crucially related to its role in combinatorial processes yielding syntactically 
mediated  PF- and SF-representations. Even though a detailed account of these 
problems clearly would go beyond the present limits, some of the broader 
perspectives will be sketched in the next section.  
5.  Combinatorial Aspects of Lexical Entries
A crucial idea of the Minimalist Program is to dispense with language particular 
syntactic rules, and even general combinatorial schemata, like X-bar syntax,  
deriving the complex, combinatorial structure by means of simple, elementary 
operations with all specific effects due to lexical information. The elementary 
operations are ‘Merge’ and ‘Move’, where Merge applies to two units taken either 
from the lexical system or constructed by means of Merge and Move. Move picks up 
a component characterized by a formal feature within a given structure built up by 
Merge and Move and assigns it to a specific place according to highly restricted 
possibilities. Of these two operations, Merge is obviously foundational, Move 
adjusting, so to speak, the results of the merger of lexical information into larger 
units.The following remarks will largely be restricted to comments on the way in 
which Merge depends on lexical information and the effects it creates.
39)
The assumption about Merge in the Minimalist Program is that it combines two 
componnents X and Y into a complex unit  with one of the merging components 
being its head. The characteristic properties of the head become the characteristic 
properties of the whole. Starting with lexical items, the characteristic properties of X 
have usually been taken to be the categorization of X.
40) Thus the general schema 
determined by Merge is (58), where X’ is a copy of the categorization of X:24
(58) (a)           [ X’  [ X  Y  ] ]              (b)           [ X’  [  Y  X  ] ]  
One of the issues to be settled is the choice between (58)(a) and (b), i.e. the 
question how linear ordering of X and Y is determined. According to considerations 
expressed in (4) above, linear ordering is irrelevant for SF (or LF, for that matter), 
and I will assume for matters of exposition that it is determined by some linearization 
principle for PF, where linearization is likely to be parameterized and dependent on 
information in X’. This is not a principled choice, and the following considerations do 
not depend on it. There is a consequence to be drawn, however, with respect to the 
status of X’, i.e. the categorization of X, for lexical items that are syntactically 
complex. Instead of going into the complex problems related to idioms like take 
advantage of in this and various other respects, I will briefly illustrate the issue for 
German prefix verbs like aufhören or anfangen, which are core items for a number of 
reasons. They are fixed units, many of them with a non-compositional, lexicalized 
Semantic Form, on which Argument Positions depend in the usual way. But while 
they are lexical units in these respects, they are syntactically complex, with 
movement separating the inflected stems from the prefix as shown in (59b):
(59)(a)  Da er wenig später aufwachte     (As he woke up a little later)
(b)  Er wachte wenig später auf         (He woke up a little later) 
However Verb-second phenomena of German and related languages are analyzed -
see Wilder (1995) for a recent approach - the alternation shown in (59) clearly 
requires the inflected stem wachte, rather than the lexical compound aufwachte, to 
be the relevant syntactic unit with regard to verb placement. As a natural conclusion  
of this observation, the projection of features assumed in (58) generalizes to the 
internal structure of lexical entries. In other words, categorization not only applies to 
a lexical item as a whole, but also to its syntactically relevant parts. We thus get 
lexical entries as illustrated in (60):
(60)(a)      [ [+V,−N]  [ [ −V,−N ] /auf/ ]  [ [ +V,−N ] /wach/ ] ]
(b)      λx    λe    [ e INST [ BECOME [ NOT [ ASLEEP x ] ] ] ]
The more familiar notation of (60a), which integrates PF with categorization, is given 
in (61), assuming that the prefix auf is to be categorized as a preposition:
(61)                                                   V
P                            V
|                              | 
auf                        wach
Notice that these considerations lead to a bipartition of lexical information: one  part 
consists of PF with categorization imposed on it, the other part consists of SF with 
subcategorization attached to it. Although this bipartition does by no means reduce 
the importance of conditions interrelating categorization and subcategorization, as 
discussed above, it suggests a slightly different distinction of lexemes and lemmas 
mentioned earlier: Now a lexeme is not just the PF of a lexical item, but rather a 
categorized PF, such that e.g. open in (35) counts as two lexemes, viz. a verb and 25
an adjective, while the transitive and the intransitive verb are two lemmas, related to 
one lexeme. There seems to be a number of facts which turn this bipartition into a 
substantial assumption that goes beyond a mere terminological convention. Among 
these facts is the relative autonomy of morphological processes that apply to a stem 
irrespective of the integrated lexical units in which it participates: give is subject to 
the same inflectional pattern gave, given in forgive, give up, give in, etc. each of 
which related to a different lemma. Similar phenomena of strong or irregular as 
opposed to weak or regular inflection show up in German, (62) giving a incomplete 
illustration:
(62)(a) Infinitiv: /sag-en/       Past:  /sag-te/      Participle   /ge-sag-t/      (say) 
(b)              /geb-en/                 /gab/                           /ge-geb-en/   (give)
/helf-en/                  /half/                           /ge-holf-en/   (help)
While regular inflection, adding e.g. the past tense affix /-te/ in German or /-d/ in 
English, can be expressed by a fairly general operation, the formation of past tense 
or past participle  in cases like (62b) requires lexical specification of the relevant 
properties of PF related to the categorization in question. This relation between PF 
and categorization carries over to complex items based on the simple stem:
(63)            /ver-geb-en/               /ver-gab/                /ver-geb-en/            (forgive)
/er-geb-en/                 /er-gab/                  /er-geb-en/              (result in)
/auf-geb-en/         /auf-gab/                /auf-ge-geb-en/       (give up)
/ein-geb-en/               /ein-gab/                 /ein-ge-geb-en/       (put in)
/nach-geb-en/            /nach-gab/              /nach-ge-geb-en/    (give way)
Wunderlich (1992, this volume) shows that a parsimonious characterisation of 
morphological properties illustrated in (62b) and (63) can be given by means of 
patterns that relate differences in PF to minimal distinctions in the categorization of 
the stems involved. In other words, morphological categorization of inflected 
compounds like (63) depends on the categorization of the stems involved. The 
systematic relations among inflectional forms of basic items must therefore be 
available to the complex items they support. Hence (64a) must carry along its 
inflectional properties to (64b) and all other compounds based on geben: 
(64) (a)   [ [+V,−N,+Fin ]  /gab/ ]
(b)  [ [+V,−N,+Fin ]   [ [ −[V,−N ] /auf/ ]   [ [+V,−N,+Fin ] /gab/ ] ] ]
In other words, (64a) must be available as a lexeme, irrespective of the SF and the 
subcategorization associated with it. It should be noted, by the way, that these are by 
no means side issues related to a few marginal entries; they must rather be 
recognized as typical phenomena of inflectional morphology, instantiating the so-
called  ‘bracketing paradox’ dealt with e.g. in Pesetsky (1985) and Bierwisch (1987).   
Returning to problems of syntactic and semantic compositionality, we notice next the 
crucial role that subcategorization plays in determining  the legitimate combination of 
two constituents X and Y: the Argument Structure of the head X determines the 
nature of the complement Y it combines with by the s- and c-selection conditions 
represented by the Argument Positions of X. This type of combination has been 
sketched in section 3, it corresponds to what used to be called Theta-Marking under 
Case-Assignment, and it can be characterized as in (65):26
(65)  Complementation: The head X merges with the complement Y into [X’ [X  Y] ] iff
(a)  the categorization Y’ of Y is compatible with the c-selection conditions 
associated  with the (lowest)  Argument Position λx of X;
(b) the Argument Position λx of X is saturated by functional application.  
The functional application referred to in (65b) is usually construed as lambda 
conversion, such that the operator λx is deleted and the variable bound by it is 
substituted by the SF of the complement - or rather by that SF with whatever is left of 
its Argument Structure. As  a result of (65b), the Argument Structure of  [X’ [ X Y ] ]  
is that of its head X minus the position λx just discharged. We might also say that the 
features associated with λx have been matched and disappear, whereas the 
categorization of Y, which they must match, remain part of the categorization of Y in 
the resulting unit [X’ [ X Y ] ]. Hence subcategorization information is saturated and 
eliminated by Complementation, while the categorization of the head as well as of 
the complement is preserved - alongside with PF and SF. (67) illustrates the effect of 
(65) by merging the copula be, provisionally given in (66), with the predicative 
adjective open represented in (25) above.
(66)    [ [ +V,−N ]  / be / ]        λP      λx      λe    [  e  INST  [  P  x  ] ]
|
[αN,αV]
(67)    [ [ +V,−N ]  [ [ [+V,−N ]  / be / ]  [ [+V,+N]  / open / ] ] ]
λx    λe   [ e INST [ λz [ OPEN z ] x ] ]
(68)   λx    λe    [ e INST  [ OPEN  x ] ]
The SF of (67) reduces to  (68) by lambda conversion, eliminating the Designated 
Position of the adjective. It must be noted that although functional application is 
indeed what Complementation essentially boils down to, a proviso is to be made with 
respect to projections of the functional heads C and D to which I will return shortly.
In addition to the head-complement combination, there is the option to combine a 
head  with an adjunct , which usually functions as a modifier of the head. As the 
levels of projection assumed in X-bar syntax are eliminated under minimalist 
assumptions, the effect of Merge for adjuncts and complements is essentially the 
same, viz. (58), except that a different type of categorization is stipulated for adjunct 
constructions.
41) Suppose now that we avoid such stipulation, relying on the fact that 
adjuncts do not saturate an Argument Position, such that Adjunction does not reduce 
the Argument Structure of the head, but rather that of the adjunct. 
Assuming that the effect of adjoining e.g. the adjective open to the head door must 
be something like (69), we get (70) as the operation that merges an adjunct with its 
head.
(69) [ [+N,-V]  [ [ [+N,+V]  / open / ]  [ [+N,-V]  / door / ] ] ]
λx   [ [  DOOR x ]   &   [ OPEN x ] ]
(70) Adjunction: The head X merges with the adjunct Y into [ X’ [ X  Y ] ],  iff 27
(a) the Designated Argument Position λx of Y can be unified with a position of X;
(b) the SF of Y forms the logical product with that of X wrt. the unified Argument 
Position.
(70) is a simplification in certain respects and hence in need of modification. First, it 
accounts only for extensional modification, as in open door, where the referent is 
both a door and open. Non-extensional cases like alleged thief must be treated 
separately, not only because here the referent is not both a thief and alleged, but 
also because alleged cannot occur as a predicative adjective syntactically. Second, 
(70a) does not specify the conditions that select the position of X that Y unifies with. 
(71) illustrates the possibility of alternative options
(71)  He left her in a bad mood.
Finally, logical product formation assumed in (70b) is the minimal assumption about 
the connection of head and modifier, although a slightly more specific relation might 
be required, the head providing a precondition for the condition of the modifier, in the 
sense mentioned in note 24. Whatever needs to be adjusted for an appropriate 
account of modification, it does not seem to affect the crucial condition that a head 
taking an adjunct preserves its Argument Structure, while a head taking a 
complement does not, as it must discharge a position to the complement in question.  
Schematically, the difference can be indicated as in (72), where the arrow indicates 
discharging of an Argument Position:
(72) (a)   Complementation                                    (b)   Adjunction
X’        X’
X’                          Y’                                        X’                             Y’
|                            |                          |                                |
X      −−−−−−>        Y                                         X        <−−−−−− Y
To conclude this rather provisional discussion of combinatorial effects related to 
Argument Positions, I will briefly comment on the saturation of the Referential 
Position considered as crucial for verbs and nouns. While Higginbotham assumes a 
third way to discharge an Argument Position, which he calls Binding of a Thematic 
Role, it seems natural to me to consider referential binding as an effect of the 
pertinent functional heads D for nouns and C for verbs. Thus the configuration [ F’ [ F  
X ] ], where F is a functional head, takes X as the complement of F, saturating at the 
same time the Referential Position of X. Suppose, as a first approximation, that (73) 
is the entry for the definite determiner:
(73)   [ [ + F, +N ]  / the / ]                λY      [  DEF x   [  Y  x ] ]
|
[+N,−V]
The c-selection associated with λY might in fact be automatically determined by the 
categorization of D = [+F,+N], such that D takes nouns as complement. While this fits 
into the schema of complementation, two important problems to be solved should at 
least be mentioned. First, if D relates to the referential domain defined by the 
nominall constituent it combines with, then the variable x in (73) must be available for 28
referential indexing. Second, the element that functional application of a lexical head 
to its complement applies to in case of DP complements must be exactly this 
referentially indexed variable, while the proper Semantic Form of the DP determines 
the domain from which the value of the variable is to be chosen according to the 
operation specified by D. Thus the VP open the door should come out as something 
like (74), where [DEF x
i  [ DOOR x
i ] ] must be construed as a generalized quantifier 
in the sense of Barwise and Cooper (1981) and later discussion
42):
(74)   [ V [ [ V /open/ ]   [ D [ [ D /the/ ]  [ N  /door / ] ] ] ] ]
      λy  λe [ [DEF x
i  [DOOR x
i ] ] : [ e INST [ y DO-CAUSE [ BECOME [OPEN x
i ] ] ] ] ]
There are various problems to be clarified here that I will not provide with ad hoc 
solutions, as they obviously go beyond the organization of lexical information, 
although they clearly are not independent of it. One of the obvious consequences of 
these matters concerns lexical entries for DPs like he, she, who, etc., the treatment 
of which would require, however, a fair amount of further discussion relating to 
combinatorial syntax as well as semantics. Another set of problems would arise with 
any attempt to give an appropriate account of the properties and combinatorial 
consequences of complementizers, i.e. the elements binding the referential 
argument position of verbs.
43)
6.  Conclusion
In this paper, I have been concerned with the tension that holds between two equally 
cogent perspectives on the nature of lexical information. On the one hand, the 
lexicon is just a list of „exceptions“, i.e. the collection of anything that does not follow 
from general principles - either those of UG or those of a specific language. On the 
other hand, this idiosyncratic information must be represented in an „optimal coding“, 
i.e. according to conditions relating not only to intra-lexical economy, but also to 
external conditions and effects, both intra- and extra-linguistically. See Chomsky 
(1995) for a recent statement of this tension. In the final section of this paper, I will 
summarize the considerations and suggest a tentative conclusion concerning the 
nature of lexical information.
Lexical information consists of collections of basic elements of linguistic structure. 
For principled reasons, these elements fall into different categories - phonetic 
features, interpreted in A-P, semantic primes, interpreted in C-I, and formal features, 
determining language-internal properties with only partial and indirect interpretation 
in extra-linguistic domains. The structure and interpretation of these repertoires is 
determined by UG, with language particular systems selected from the general 
inventory and possibly parameter values fixed by language specific options. This 
universal background of the basic inventory constitutes a first aspect of systematicity 
underlying the idiosyncratic lexical infomation. In other words, what might enter the 
list of lexical items comes from a highly organized domain of possibilities, 
determining to a large extent the „optimal coding“. An equally important aspect 
concerns the configuration of the primitive elements within the individual lexical 
items. This aspect has at least two facets. First, there are the systematic 
components of a lexical entry, viz. PFLE, SFLE, and GFLE, the latter consisting of 
categorization and subcategorization, which in turn comprises s- and c-selection. 29
These components are related to the levels of I-Language, although for fundamental 
reasons, they cannot simply be reduced to these levels, since GFLE determines the 
computable aspects of the correlation between the SF and PF of complex 
expressions. Second, there are systematic dependencies both within and among 
these components, organizing the configurations of primitive elements in PFLE, SFLE, 
and the sub-components of GFLE. The specific constraints which in this sense 
determine the configurations permitted as possible lexical entries are in part given by 
UG - for example the semantically determined canonical hierarchy of Argument 
Positions as indicated in (16) - and in part by language particular conditions, such as 
the Case assignment for directional prepositions sketched in (22b). 
An obvious consequence of these observations is the fact that on the one hand the 
information listed in lexical entries is idiosyncratic, hence conventional and 
susceptible to historical change, while on the other hand, by no means every 
alternative collection of basic elements could be listed as a lexical entry.
A less obvious, and possibly more interesting consequence of these considerations 
is the fact that there are different types of idiosyncrasy or irregularity. Let me 
illustrate this point by a simple example. According to the previous discussion, we 
would have the follwoing entries for the German prepositions in (in/into), bei (near), 
and zu (to/towards), where [ PROX  x ] selects the proximal and [ INT x ] the internal 
environment of x:
(75)     / bei / [ −V,−N ]       λx    λy    [          y  LOC  [ PROX x ] ]
(76)     / in  /    [ −V,−N ]       λx    λy    [ (FIN) y  LOC  [ INT x ] ]   
(77)    / zu /     [ −V,−N ]       λx    λy    [  FIN  y  LOC  [ PROX x ] ]
| 
[+Obl]
By general assumption, all information listed in these entries is idiosyncratic, i.e. it 
does not follow from general conditions.
44) Thus, that bei begins with a voiced labial 
stop (and not e.g. a voiceless fricative) and selects the proximal rather than e.g. the 
vertical environment of the relatum is unpredictable in just this sense. Also, the fact 
that (76) collapses two items (due to the optionality of FIN), while (75) and (77) are 
single items, is an idiosyncratic property. What I want to emphasize, however, is the 
following. (75) and (76) do not specify Case information, as this follows from 
Structural Case Assignment for prepositions according to (57c), providing Dativ for 
(75) as well as for the locative variant of (76). Furthermore the directional variant of 
(76) receives Accusative by (22b). Because of this general condition on German 
prepositions, however, (77) must provide the idiosyncratic condition [+Obl], which 
would be the predictable Case, if zu were not a directional preposition. Thus, even 
though zu assigns the default Case of prepositions, the Dative is an irregularity, as it 
comes with the semantic condition of directionality. To put it the other way round, if 
the general condition (22b) were dropped, zu would become a fully regular 
preposition that would not have to be lexically marked, in order to assign Dative.
45)
Finally, prepositions like während (during), trotz (inspite of) are idiosyncratically 
marked for Genitive - irrespective of condition (22b). Thus, even with respect to an 
apparently simple phenomenon like objective Case of prepositions, three types of 
idiosyncrasy can be distinguished - depending on the intervening general conditions.30
Other cases illustrating the same sort of distinctions could easily be adduced. 
This leads to a more general remark on the nature of lexical information from a 
minimalist perspective. The requirement of optimal, i.e. redundancy free, coding of 
lexical entries is directly related to the rules and principles organizing the 
representation of lexical information. According to the Minimalist Program, these 
rules and principles should not depend on (i) arbitrary stipulations, and (ii) specific
conditions of individual languages - except in rather restricted, presumably parameter
dependent ways. In order to clarify (ii), let us consider the following general schema:
(78)                                                    I-Language
Lexical System                         R-P I
Set of Entries                     R-P II
This schema expresses the notion that a given I-Language is determined by certain 
Rules or Principles, R-P I, and its Lexical System, which in turn consists of the set of 
lexical entries and certain Rules and Principles II. Put this way, the tension between 
the two conceptions of lexical information mentioned earlier can be ascribed to the 
distinction between the Lexical System, and the Set of Entries, where the latter, 
though determined by R-P II, contains all and only the ‘irregularities’ of the language.
There are now a number of possibilities concerning the status of R-P II and its 
relation to R-P I:
(79) (a)  Both R-P I and R-P II apply equally to lexical entries and complex 
expressions, such that there would be no distinction between them.
(b)  There are Rules or Principles R-P II that apply within the Lexical System,
but not outside of it.
(c)  R-P I consists exclusively of Principles defined by UG, while language 
specific Rules must belong to R-P II.
I want to conclude this discussion with some remarks related to these distinctions, 
which do not, of course, exhaust the conceivable possibilities. 
First, it should be obvious that the options (79)(a) to (c) make increasingly specific 
claims about the organization of I-Language.
46) Assuming that e.g. conditions on the 
organization of Argument Structure must apply within the Lexical System in the 
sense that their effect must be fixed, before lexical entries enter a ‘Numeration’ in the 
sense of Chomsky (1995), from which complex expressions are constructed, I will 
adopt (79b). Assuming furthermore that the construction of complex expressions 
from a Numeration is determined by only universal principles, suggests that we adopt 
(79c). In other words, we do have a system R-P II that operates inside the Lexical 
System, and that language specific rules belong to this system. This does not imply, 
however, that general principles of R-P I do not control the organization of lexical 
information.
Second, (79c) does not mean that R-P II consists of only language particular rules, 
including the idiosyncrasies of morphology, or the specific conditions on Case 31
assignment, etc. Notice, incidentally, that it is by no means obvious in advance that 
conditions that refer to language specific choices - like morphological Case, Gender, 
or Number - cannot be based on universal patterns as suggested e.g. in footnote 37 
with respect to Abstract Case. In other words, even Principles that determine strictly 
intra-lexical properties of I-Language may belong to UG directly, even though 
language specific implementation of Principles of UG might be the characteristic 
situation in R-P II. For the sake of illustration, consider the principles we have used in 
order to collapse different lexical items into one entry. These principles rely on 
general conditions on disjunctive ordering (the so-called „elsewhere-condition“), 
accompanied by Boolean conditions on selected feature values or components. 
Thus the mechanisms on which this aspect of economy relies are universal, but 
furnished with language specific options. This might ultimately hold also for rules and 
patterns of inflectional morphology, as Wunderlich (1992 and this volume) illustrates 
in interesting ways.
Third, as a consequence of these considerations, even the set of lexical entries 
ceases to be an unstructured list, it rather exhibits systematic internal organization. 
One aspect of this organization might be the layers envisaged in Lexical Morphology 
and Phonology as initiated by Kiparsky (1982). Another aspect concerns the 
distinction between basic and complex items, major lexical and functional categories, 
stems and affixes, to mention the more obvious distinctions.    
Even though there are various alternatives to be explored, the assumption that 
lexical information is subject to economizing principles that properly belong to the 
Lexical System should be taken as an indispensible ingredient of the minimalist 
perspective.
Footnotes
1) Chomsky refers to A-P and C-I as performance systems. This might be misleading 
if one relates it to the terminology that distinguishes between competence and 
performance in the sense of e g. Chomsky (1965). As a matter of fact, structures in 
A-P,  and even more so in C-I, are subject to tacit or implicit knowledge (in the sense 
of pertinent competence), on which the relevant performance may be based. In other 
words, the term ‘performance system’ must be understood as merely fixing the 
perspective, where I-language recruits patterns in A-P and C-I to implement linguistic 
expressions, without denying their respective knowledge systems.
2) It is an empirical point which modality of perception and production P-A relies on. 
While for clearly non-incidental reasons auditory perception and articulation are the 
canonical implementation of P-A, it is important to note that sign languages show the 
accessibility of the visual modality as a primary choice (not - like writing - based on 
spoken language). For the role of linearity in sign language see e.g. Sandler (1989).
3) It seems to me worth noticing that this schema closely matches basic assumptions 
made e.g. in Hjelmslev (1961), where Form and Substance are distinguished for both 
the Content- and Expression-Plane, which can be schematized in the following way:32
(i)                  Expression Plane                             Content Plane
Substance   <===>    Form     ------ Form   <===>   Substance
Expression- and Content-Substance correspond to A-P and C-I, respectively, the 
respective Forms to PF and LF. Hjelmslev considers the relation between Form and 
Substance as manifestation, assuming that a given Form can manifest itself in 
different ways (and different substances, for that matter). The obvious similarity 
between (1) and (i) might be taken to indicate that we are indeed facing conceptual 
necessities.
4) See Bierwisch (1996) for further comments on the notion that a level of 
representation might be used by two (or more) mental systems, such that e.g. PF 
might be considered as a specific aspect of a representational system recruiting 
configurations of A-P, subject to the conditions or operations imposed by G. 
Alternatively, PF (or LF, for that matter), is to be construed as a level of 
representation of its own, that needs to be related to configurations of A-P  (or C-I) 
by specific correspondence rules or principles. The latter view is advocated by 
Jackendoff (1994) as the concept of representational modularity, considering a 
module as a level of representation.
5) One might, with Bickerton (1995), consider the lexicon not just as a conceptual 
necessity of language, but as a factual prerequisite of its phylogenetic development, 
arguing that the gradual expansion of lexical knowledge is a byproduct (or even a 
driving force) in the phylogenetic brain growth. On this view, the characteristic 
property of the (pre-linguistic) phase of Proto-Language is the capacity to associate 
fixed configurations of two mental domains.
6) As a matter of fact, the availability of discrete infinity might, according to 
considerations of Chomsky (1988), be taken as the crucial property that constitutes 
the language capacity - together perhaps with the capacity for arithmetic. More 
specifically the application of this capacity to a body of lexical knowledge might be 
the „big bang“ of Bickerton (1995) or Pinker (1994), by which the evolution created  
the human linguistic capacity.  
7) For some discussion of PF representations along these lines see e.g. Clements 
(1985) or Sagey (1986). It might be noted that the layers of organization - features 
arranged in tiers, segments, syllables - seem to be invariant with respect to modality. 
As e.g. Sandler (1989) and Perlmutter (1992) show, American Sign Language 
exhibits essentially the same type of organization - which is, of course, an empirical 
observation, not a conceptual necessity.  In what follows, I will not be concerned with 
details of PF and indicate representations simply by alphabetic spelling.
8) Although various versions of categorial or type systems are used in formal, model 
theoretic semantics, I do not want to commit myself to model theoretic semantics in 
any formal sense. 
9) The interpretability of elements is not always obvious. For the sake of illustration, 
consider the phonetic interpretation of standard orthography, where the distinction 33
between different letters as a rule receives a phonetic value, while the distinction of 
capitals vs. lower case letters does not, and the status of space is unclear in this 
respect. Notice also that spacing as well as the use of capitals appears to be 
economical with regard to the computation involved in reading. 
10) Notice incidentally that the assumption of phonological derivations raises the 
question of intermediate representations going beyond schema (1), a  not at all trivial 
issue, which I will not take up here. See also note 26 for a similar problem at the 
semantic side.
11) To mention just two: first, as is well known, (8a) and (8b) are not really 
synonymous - put on the shelf is less specific than shelve, an issue that was 
intensively discussed with respect to similar proposals in the Generative Semantics 
framework. See e.g. Fodor (1970) for critical remarks. (It might be noted, incidentally, 
that there is a remarkable similarity between certain tenets of the LRS-approach and 
the proposals of Generative Semantics.) Second, Hale and Keyser consider it as an 
argument in favor of their analysis, that, inspite of the existence of particle verbs like 
take over etc., there is no shelve on or bottle in, because their derivation would 
violate the ECP, constraining Head Movement. Notice, however, that exactly this 
type of verbs is rather productive in German: aus-grenzen (cause NP to be outside 
the boundary), ein-kleiden (put NP in clothes), ein-tüten (put NP into bags), and 
many others. Even English would, on this analysis, violate the ECP in verbs like 
fence NP in. 
12) It would not be appropriate, by the way, to simply assume that LCS, belonging to 
CS, is outside I-Language, so that Jackendoff’s Syntactic Structure would 
correspond to LF as the only level of syntactic representation. This is by no means 
just a terminological issue, even though some of the problems involved are not easily 
assigned to one or the other domain, the syntactic or semantic treatment of binding 
being a case in point.
13) It should be emphasized for terminological reasons that by „semantics“ I have in 
mind the conceptual and intentional interpretation of linguistic expressions, i.e. an 
internalist, not a reference based (model theoretic) semantics. If one includes this 
internalist semantics into the realm of syntax because of its necessarily 
representational character, one would presumably have to conclude with Chomsky 
(1995a) that natural language has only syntax and pragmatics. This leaves us, 
however, with the necessary distinction between the combinatorial aspects of 
conceptual structure as opposed to the compositional properties  of linguistic 
expressions, depending on I-Language. In other words, I take semantics as the 
interpretation in C-I, as envisaged in the Minimalist Program.
14) This is actually the gist of categorial systems as used e.g. in Cresswell (1973), 
Steedman (1989)  and related work, where syntactic categories are in fact identified 
with semantic types.
15) Features for which conceptual interpretation is rather unlikely, are those defining 
structural Case like Nominative, Accusative, Absolutive, etc, as opposed to notional 
Case like Locative, Allative, Elative, etc., although the Localistic Theory of Case 
proposes abstract spatial interpretation even for Cases like Nominative, Accusative, 
see e.g. Hjelmslev (1935/1937) for detailed discussion. Somewhat different 34
considerations apply to what Bech (1955) called Status as a verbal category, which 
includes Infinitive and Participle. 
16) Whether the moving or the target feature is associated with conceptual content 
need not concern us here, as I will propose a slightly different way to look at the 
checking metaphor below.
17) Thus SHELF is not really a unit of type 1 - the type of individuals, but rather a 
one-plcace predicate, i.e. of type 0/1. What we would need in a more explicit 
account, is something like (i), where  g  represents something like the canonical or 
generic carrier of the property SHELF:
(i)            [  y    ON     g ]   &   [  SHELF     g  ]
This restriction to the ‘canonical shelf’ might be related to the more specific 
interpretation of shelve as opposed to put on the shelf mentioned in note 11).
18) This does not exclude, incidentally, the possibility of improper argument positions 
whithout semantic content, technically speaking lambda operators that don’t bind a 
variable. Thus the subject of so called weather verbs is not semantically licensed. 
More complex cases are verbs like es handelt sich um NP (it is the question of NP), 
where both es and sich are improper arguments. Those cases are highly restricted in 
several respects, though.
19) This can be taken as a generalization of Case-marking as assumed in Chomsky 
(1981), where Case-assignment (rather than eliminating by checking) was construed 
as the prerequisite for an argument to successfully combine with its head. The 
generalization concerns the fact that formal features in general, rather than merely 
Case features, might be involved in the relevant condition.
20) One might, by the way, assume that the association of c-features with lambda 
operators is mediated by functional heads such as AGR(eement), T(ense), etc.  If 
[Acc] in (18) should in fact be dependent on AGR-O,  the lexical entry of the 
functional head would be something like (i) with empty PF:
(i)    / PF /     [ AGR-O]        λV         [ λx     λy  [ [ V  x ]  y  ] ]
|
[ Acc ] 
I will not go into technical details, assuming rather that minimalist conditions should 
prevent empty categories where possible, as suggested in Chomsky (1995).
21) Actually, the effect of the functor FIN is slightly more complex, as it must assign 
to its argument the structure of a path in order to pick out the final part or goal of the 
path. I will take this to be the automatic consequence of the interpretation of [FIN x] 
in C-I, where the interpretation of x determines the character of the path it creates. 
See Bierwisch (1988) for details. 
22) Whether or not directional and locative prepositions and adverbials are to be 
categorized by the feature [+Dir(ectional)] and [-Dir], respectively, depends on a 
number of problems I cannot pursue here. See Bierwisch (1988) for some 35
discussion. In case [+Dir] is in fact a formal feature categorizing syntactic 
constituents, it would belong to those that are fairly transparent with respect to their 
semantic correspondent and conceputal interpretation. We could express this 
relation by a lexical condition of the following sort:
(i)   [FIN x] and [INIT x]  imply  [+Dir] in the categorization of [-N,-V] entries, if x is 
bound by the highest Argument Position.   
The component [INIT(ial part of) x] includes source-prepositions like aus (out of), von
(from), which are grammatically directional. Condition (i) is certainly in need of 
modification in several respects, it is merely meant here as an indication of the 
generalization relevant to the interpretation of [+Dir].
23) For discussion of a formal semantics of DO and CAUSE see Dowty (1979). The 
construal of propositions as sets of events or states can be made precise in various 
ways. The event-instantiation ‘e’ introduced in (23c) will be related below to the E-
position considered in Higginbotham (1985) and related work.
24) This can be made precise by means of a three-valued logic in ways that I will not 
pursue here. It might be noted, though, that NOT[ p : q ]  should come out as 
equivalent to  p : NOT q, both having the truth-value of NOT q, iff p is true, being 
undefined otherwise.
25) This does not exclude the possibility that presupposition is a heterogeneous 
phenomenon to which various sources besides lexical information contribute. See 
e.g. Choon-Kyu and Dinneen (1979) for an early, extensive discussion of different 
approaches to the problem. I need not go here into the ramified issues, but simply 
take for granted that change-of-state verbs introduce a lexical presupposition of the 
kind illustrated by cases like (28).
26) Like the principles compensating for underspecification in PF, definitions like 
those in (24) would have to be understood as principles deriving complete interface 
representations from redundancy free lexical information. As for PF, the question of 
intermediate levels of representation arises, as mentioned in note 10.
27) This cannot be the whole story yet, however,  because as it stands (37) is less 
complex than (36), which is contrary to fact: The optional causativity of open, clear, 
fix, etc. is clearly the more frequent, more neutral property, compared to the 
obligatory causativity of clean. There is an obvious desideratum, which I will not 
pursue here.
28) The notion of a Referential Theta-role was first proposed in Williams (1981), 
where it was construed on a par with roles like Agent, Experiencer, Theme, etc., i.e. 
as characterizing the content of an Argument Position. It was obvious right from the 
beginning, though, that a rather different aspect is at issue here, as the Referential
role of nouns like perceiver, percept, employer and employee is that of  Experiencer, 
Theme, Agent and Patent, respectively. In other words, what defines the content of 
an Argument Position as Agent, Goal, Experiencer, etc. is independent from its 
status as Referential. Similar comments apply to the distinction of Internal and 
External Position or Role.36
29)  This observation, which might be in need of some refinements, has sometimes 
led to the claim that Nouns generally don’t take complements, but only adjuncts (or 
something in between called complement-adjuncts). See e.g. Grimshaw (1990) for 
arguments to that effect. In view of the fact that optional arguments and modifiers 
might not necessarily be distinct under certain conditions, as I have argued in 
Bierwisch (1988), the essence of complement-adjuncts might simply be the status of 
optional Argument Positions. 
30)  The Referential Position of Verbs thus corresponds to the E-position proposed 
in Higginbotham (1985).
31)  For further discussion of event-nominalizations that essentially switch the 
syntactic categorization of a verb to that of a noun see Bierwisch (1990) where the 
consequences of this switch are spelled out in more detail.
32)  Alternative proposals to specify syntactic category features have been made 
repeatedly. See e.g. Jackendoff (1977), or the discussion of Wunderlich and Steinitz, 
summarized from a typological point of view in Steinitz (1995).
33)  One obvious point of language particular variation concerns the exploitation of 
the category features: Languages need not distinguish the four categories assumed 
here. See the references in note 32 for some discussion.
34)  It might be noted, incidentally, that frieren can also be used as a weather-verb in 
constructions like es friert (it’s freezing), which requires an entry analogous to that of 
the verb rain mentioned earlier:
(i)      / frier /      [+V,-N]   λx      λe        [ e INST   [  COLD ] ] 
By means of the notational conventions already mentioned, (i) could be collapsed 
with (51) as shown in (ii):
(ii)    / frier /     [+V,-N]          λx         λe        [ e INST   [  COLD  (β x ) ] ]
|
(α[+Obj])
Condition:  If  β  =  −  , then   α  =   − .
For  β  =  −, COLD must be a proposition, like RAIN, turning  λx into an improper 
argument, which is subject to general constraints on improper argument positions. 
There are various problems to be clarified, which I cannot pursue here any further.
35)  ASK is, of course, an abbreviation with roughly the following definition:
(i)  [ [ ASK  x ]  y ]  z   ==DEF z  DO-CAUSE  [ y  KNOW  [ z  WANT [ z  KNOW  x  ] ] ]
As (i) shows more clearly, λz is the Agent,  λx the Theme, and λy the Recipient or 
Addressee of the act of asking. This is not intended as a complete account of fragen, 
but only as a provisional characterization of the s-selection associated with it.37
36)  The notion of modification and of referential binding inherent in these 
considerations is largely that of Higginbotham (1985). See also Bierwisch (1988).
37) The notion of Abstract Case as proposed by Kiparsky (1993) and adapted in 
Wunderlich (1994) might be a step in this direction. Kiparsky suggests that abstract 
Case features might simply derive from the place of an argument position in the 
Argument Structure of a verb, such that for verbs with one, two, and three structural 
arguments the configurations in (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, emerge (using 
Wunderlichs features ‘lr’ meaning „there is a lower role“, and ‘hr’ meaning „there is a 
higher role“):
(i)          λx1 (ii)        λx2 λx1 (iii)        λx3 λx2 λx1
|                                |             |                               |            |            |
−hr                           +hr         −hr                           +hr       +hr        −hr
−lr                            −lr          +lr                             −lr        +lr         +lr
These abstract Case features are realized by morphological Case according to 
language particular specifications, which would for German be as follows:
(iv)                          Nom                Acc                Dat
hr            −                      +                      +
lr    −                      −                      +
Under these conditions, language particular specifications would be completely 
reduced to morphologiocal features and their realization, while conditions on 
Structural Case underlying (i) to (iii) are completely universal. One interesting 
consequence of this approach is the fact that it might explain the restriction of 
Argument Structure to maximally three structural positions: The configurations (i) to 
(iii) exhaust the possibilities that can be distinguished by means of the abstract 
features hr and lr. Even though these proposals account for a number of interesting 
facts, I will leave it at that, as it is not clear at present how it can account for Case of 
complements of nouns, adjectives, and prepositions in non-trivial ways.
38) Notice that the generalization expressed in (22) for Case of locative vs. 
directional prepositions interlocks structural Dative and lexical Accusative, related to 
the pertinent condition in SF.
39)  The notion of derivational economy requires Move to be restricted to cases 
where its application is indispensible. Even though these cases belong to the very 
core of natural languages, the position of the finite verb in Germanic languages being 
a case in point, I will not go into the controversial details to be observed in this 
connection. The effects of Merge discussed here must be considered as a 
prerequisite in any case. 
40) In Chomsky (1995) it is proposed to consider the complete lexical information of 
a lexical head X as its characteristic properties X’, avoiding the issue as to what 
exactly constitutes the X’ of a lexical unit X. The operation Spell Out, however, that 
separates  PF information from the rest has to sort out the features of X into various 
components, anyway. Hence given the rich structure of LE motivated here, I will stick 38
to the traditional notion that a lexical item projects its categorization in terms of 
formal features. We will encounter additional motivation for this assumption shortly.      
41) That is in fact the proposal developed in Chomsky (1995), where Adjunction is 
supposed to lead to a categorization that identifies the result of Merge as composed 
of segments. Gaertner (1995) discusses some of the problems that emerge from this 
assumption, which seems to me dispensible, if adjunction is characterized by the 
manner in which the Argument Position of the adjunct is discharged, as proposed 
e.g. in Higginbotham (1985). I will turn to this alternative immediately.
42) Intuitively, the SF representation of (74) is derived by discharging the object 
position λx of open, replacing the variable x by x
i and adjoining the precondition [DEF 
x
i [ DOOR x
i ] ] to the SF of open. I will not go into the formal details of this operation 
here.                                               
43) A detailed discussion of the formal features of C-elements of German and 
English can be found in Wilder (1995), accounting especially for the intra-clausal 
effects of different complementizers. What needs to be developed is an analysis of 
both the formal and semantic properties of different C-elements which account for 
their properties as heads not only of main clauses, but also of various types of 
complement clauses, as in
(i)     I know that/whether he will come
(ii)    I know who one should ask
(iii)   I know where to go/who to ask
44) It should be obvious that further general conditions would reduce the information 
that must be specified in these and other cases discussed earlier. Suppose, for 
instance, that the normal Argument Structure of a preposition requires exactly two 
obligatory positions, then the indication of λx and λy in (75) to (77) would have to be 
dropped. Similar considerations apply throughout. What I am trying to clarify here is 
the nature and consequence of general conditions, not their actual content for a 
particular set of lexical entries.
45) It is worth noticing that these distinctions would change in detail, but not in  
principle, if (57c) would be changed such that Accusative becomes the Structural 
Case for the object of prepositions, and (22b) would assign [+Obl] in case FIN is 
absent, rather than [−Obl], if FIN is present.
46) As a matter of fact, the two dimensions underlying these distinctions, namely 
intra- vs. extra-lexical conditions, and language specific vs. universal conditions, are 
independent of each other. More specifically, the assumption of extra-lexical, 
language specific rules is not only logically possible, but has been taken for granted 
at least until the Principles- and Parameter-Theory was introduced in Chomsky 
(1981).
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